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Abstract
A REPORT OF US PHYSICIANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE AND A BIOETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRACTICE.
Peter T. Hetzler III, James Nie, Amanda Zhou, and Lydia S. Dugdale. Department of
Internal Medicine, Yale University, School of Medicine, New Haven, CT.

The goals of this work were two fold. The first was to assess the beliefs of US
physicians about the national legalization of physician-assisted suicide (PAS). The
second was to determine the moral permissibility of PAS through a bioethical analysis.
For the former, we sent a survey to 1000 randomly chosen physicians from around the
US. For the last, we analyzed the permissibility of PAS by examining four common
bioethical considerations—role morality, the “slippery slope”, doing vs. allowing, and
intending vs. foreseeing.
Our survey indicates that 60% of physicians thought PAS should be legal, and of
that 60%, 13% answered “yes” when asked if they would perform the practice if it were
legal. Next, 49% of physicians agreed that most patients who seek PAS do so because of
pain, and 58% agreed that the current safeguards in place for PAS, in general, are
adequate to protect patients. With respect to specific safeguards, 60 % disagreed with the
statement that physicians who are not psychiatrists are adequately trained to screen for
depression in patients seeking PAS, and 60% disagreed with the idea that physicians can
predict with certainty whether a patient seeking PAS has 6 months or less to live. Finally,
about one-third (30%) of physicians thought that the legalization of PAS would lead to
the legalization of euthanasia, and 46% agreed that insurance companies would

preferentially cover PAS over possible life-saving treatments if PAS was legalized
nationally. Finally, by examining the bioethical arguments mentioned with respect to
PAS, we determined that the practice is not morally permissible
Our survey results suggest several important conclusions about physicians’ beliefs
of PAS. The first is that there is a discrepancy between belief and practice of PAS.
Second, physicians are generally misinformed as to why patients seek PAS, and they are
uncertain about the adequacy of safeguards. Third, physicians are still wary of the
slippery slope with respect to PAS legalization nationwide. Furthermore, through our
bioethical analysis, we show that PAS is morally impermissible.
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Opening Remarks
Physician-assisted suicide (PAS), also known as physician aid-in-dying (AID), is
one of the most contentious ethical issues facing medicine today. American Medical
Association (AMA) states that, “Physician-assisted suicide occurs when a physician
facilitates a patient’s death by providing the necessary means and/or information to
enable the patient to perform the life-ending act.”(1) This practice was first legalized by
Oregon through the Death with Dignity Act in 1997.(2) Since then, six other jurisdictions
have legalized the practice, and Montana has decriminalized it(3). As a comparison,
internationally, physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia are legal in Canada,
Netherlands, Belgium, Colombia, and Luxemburg.(4) A recent Gallup poll indicates that
67% of the American public support legalization of PAS.(5) Support for the practice
among physicians has also risen from 46 % in 2010 and 54 % in 2014 to 57 % in 2016.(6)
Physician-assisted suicide is defined as a physician prescribing a lethal dose of
drugs that patients then administer themselves with the intention of ending their lives.
This practice is distinct from euthanasia, in which a physician directly administers a drug
or drugs with the intention of ending the patient’s life. The major distinction between the
two is who administers the lethal dose of medication. In the former, the patient
administers it. In the latter, the physician is the agent who administers the lethal dose.
Although this may seem like a rather small distinction, it makes all the difference. The
patient is the agent who causes her own death in the first case, while the physician is the
agent who causes the death of the patient in the latter case.
In the US, there are certain conditions or safeguards that must be met for a patient
to successfully obtain a prescription for a lethal dose of barbiturates, which are the drugs
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of choice for PAS. Although each state has slightly different conditions, they all closely
follow Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, as it was the first state to legalize assisted
suicide.
For brevity and clarity, I will explain Oregon’s program. First, the patient must be
at least 18 years old, a resident of Oregon, and capable of making medical decisions
(meaning the patient must be competent). The next condition is that the patient must be
diagnosed with a terminal illness that will end her life in 6 months or less. Then, a patient
must make two oral requests to her physician that are separated by at least fifteen days.
Following this, a patent must provide a written request to her physician that is signed in
the presence of two witnesses. The original physician and a consulting physician must
then confirm the prognosis and diagnosis of the patient. At this time, they must also
assess the patient for competency. If, during this examination, they determine that the
patient may be depressed or suffering from any mental illness, they must refer the patient
to a psychiatrist for a formal psychological assessment. Once all of these steps have been
completed (as necessary), the original physician must inform the patient of alternatives to
PAS, such as hospice, comfort care, and pain control, and request (but not require) the
patient to inform next-of-kin about her decision to partake in PAS. The physician may
then provide the patient a written prescription for a lethal dose of barbiturates that the
patient may then ingest at whatever time she thinks is appropriate.(7)
As this practice increasingly becomes an option for patients and their physicians
to consider, it is important to understand what the attitudes and perspectives of practicing
US physicians are concerning PAS and discuss the moral permissibility of the practice. In
Part I of this thesis I will report the findings of a national study looking at perspectives of
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US physicians with respect to PAS. In Part II, I will first discuss the moral permissibility
of PAS by analyzing four bioethical arguments.
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Part I: A Report of Physicians’ Beliefs about and Practices of PAS
Introduction
A recent review of attitudes and practices of PAS in the US, Canada, and Europe
concluded that PAS is increasingly becoming legalized, is performed relatively rarely,
and is primarily utilized by patients with cancer.(8) A national survey study in 2008
about physicians’ attitudes toward PAS also revealed that highly religious physicians are
more likely to oppose PAS than those with low religiosity.(9) These data are consistent
with previous findings of national surveys of physicians and osteopathic physicians that
found that religion was associated with objections to PAS.(10,11) The 2008 study also
found that being of Asian ethnicity, of Hindu religious affiliation, and having more
experience with end-of-life care were also associated with objecting to the practice of
PAS.(9)
Although those are the only national survey studies looking at physician attitudes
toward PAS, there have been several institutional and regional studies examining views
of physicians, which have shown that physicians’ views toward PAS are affected by
religion, religiosity, ethnicity, medical specialty, and age. Cohen et al. showed that in
Washington State in 1994, oncologists and hematologists were least likely to support
PAS, while psychiatrists were most likely.(12) A 1995 study of Michigan oncologists
revealed five factors that were important to physicians when considering the approval or
disapproval of PAS: global attitudes toward PAS (including ideas like “Does a patient
have a right to end his or her life if he or she has an incurable disease,” and “Oncologists
should have the right to help a patient commit suicide by medical means”), attitudes
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toward the acceptability of withholding/withdrawing life-sustaining therapies,
philosophical prohibitions toward PAS, concerns of legal consequences of PAS, and
beliefs that PAS could be avoided with better end-of-life care.(13) A study of Oregon
emergency medicine physicians in 1996 showed that support of legalization of PAS was
not influenced by gender, age, or practice location. It did show, however, those without
religious affiliations were more likely to support PAS legalization, and Catholic
respondents were least likely to support it.(14)
A survey of Connecticut physicians in 2000 showed that views on PAS were
strongly associated with religious affiliation, religiosity, ethnicity, and medical
specialty.(15) A survey given to Tennessee physicians in 2003 found that factors that
influenced beliefs about PAS were ethics, religion, and the role of the physician to relieve
pain and suffering.(16) Connecticut internists’ attitudes toward PAS in 2004 were
significantly influenced by frequency of attendance of religious services and experience
providing primary care to terminally ill patients.(17) Another study in Connecticut in
2004 showed that medical house officers from three different internal medicine residency
programs were possibly influenced by religious commitments and pressures of training
when thinking about the acceptability of performing PAS.(18)
Most recently, a study at a large academic institution found that 63% percent of
physicians thought PAS should be legal, but only 22% of that percentage would be
willing to participate in the practice.(19) This trend was also observed in Tennessee
physicians in 2003—of the physicians who supported PAS, only 25% indicated that they
would perform it.(16) This is an important finding that requires further study to be
understood more thoroughly. If the practice of PAS is to be continually expanded to more
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states without understanding why physicians are generally supportive of PAS but
opposed to actually preforming it, it could lead to numerous problems including feelings
of dissatisfaction with or mistrust of the profession of medicine by both physicians and
patients, poor outcomes surrounding PAS, and a lack of appropriate and effective end-oflife care.
Thus, the aims of this study were threefold. The first was to investigate whether
the discrepancy between attitudes about legalization versus willingness to practice PAS
holds true nationally. Our hypothesis is that it does. Next, we assessed why this
discrepancy between belief and willingness to practice exists. Finally, we aimed to update
and expand the understanding of physicians’ attitudes toward PAS since the last national
study was in 2008. We have included questions regarding the beliefs of physicians on
possible economic and social ramifications of PAS legalization and the efficacy of
safeguards in place, which to our knowledge have not been previously studied by a
national survey.
Methods
Approval
This study was reviewed and approved by the Yale University’s Institutional
Review Board.
Survey Design
We used an amended version of methods previously described to design our
survey.(20) First, we tested eleven questions (see appendix 1) about PAS on fifteen YaleNew Haven Hospital physicians. Each physician received a US$10 gift card for
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participating. This first testing step helped us choose appropriate wording and content of
questions. Using this data, we then developed our first 37-question survey. To eliminate
as much bias as possible, we attempted to ask an equal number of positively and
negatively worded questions regarding PAS. This survey was then administered to ten
Yale-New Haven physicians (different from the previous 15) in person. The physicians
were asked to take the survey and provide feedback in real-time about the relevance,
wording, clarity, and effectiveness of each question. Each physician received a US$20
dollar gift card for participation. Following the feedback given to us during the pretest,
we designed our final survey. As a final check for survey validity, we sent the finalized
survey to three individuals with experience in survey design before administering it.
Survey Content
The final survey can be found in the appendix (appendix 2). We first defined the
terms “physician-assisted suicide (PAS),” “physician aid-in-dying (AID),” and euthanasia
in a preamble to eliminate possible confusion in terminology. The survey contained six
sections. The first was “Legality of PAS/AID” and included the questions “Should
PAS/AID be legal in your state?” and “Should PAS/AID be decriminalized in your
state?” which could be answered yes or no. The third question asked, “If legal or
decriminalized, would you participate in PAS/AID?” which could be answered with yes,
possibly, unlikely, or never.
The second section was “Current Practices of PAS/AID”, which asked participants to
what extent they agreed on a five point Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, neutral,
disagree, strongly disagree) with statements about reasons for patients seeking PAS/AID
and safety and efficacy of current safeguards in states where the practice is legal. This
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section of the survey was designed to assess the knowledge and beliefs of physicians
about current practices of PAS/AID. The statements were the following:

•
•

•

•

Most patients who seek PAS/AID do so because of physical pain.
Current PAS/AID laws provide safeguards (patient must be competent, ≥ 18 yo,
prognosis ≤ 6 mo, capable of self-administration of medication, request observed
by 2 witnesses).
o These safeguards are adequate to protect patients seeking PAS/AID.
Current PAS/AID laws require physicians who suspect depression or other mental
illness in a patient seeking PAS/AID to consult a psychiatrist.
o Physicians who are not psychiatrists are sufficiently trained to screen for
depression in patients who are seeking PAS/AID.
Most physicians can predict with certainty whether a patient seeking PAS/AID
has 6 months or less to live.

Section three, entitled “Implications of PAS/AID”, included statements concerning
the social, professional, and economic implications of the national legalization of
PAS/AID. Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the
statements on the same Likert scale. This section was designed to ask physicians
questions that they might not normally think about when considering the legalization of
PAS. The statements were the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

PAS/AID would improve the clinical care of patients at the end-of-life.
Patients would view the medical profession more negatively.
Patients would trust their physicians more.
Racial and ethnic minorities would feel pressure to end their lives.
Patients with lower socioeconomic status would feel pressure to end their lives.
Patients with mental or physical disabilities would feel pressure to end their lives.
PAS/AID would save money for the health care system.
Health insurance companies would cover PAS/AID over more expensive,
possibly life-saving treatments, like chemotherapy.
PAS/AID would lead to an increased number of medical malpractice suits.
PAS/AID would lead to an increase in suicides in the community.
PAS/AID would lead to the legalization of euthanasia.
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The next section, “Other Considerations Regarding PAS/AID,” included ethical and
moral statements about PAS/AID that could be answered using the same Likert scale.
The statements were the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to relieve suffering.
Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to respect patient
autonomy.
There are important ethical distinctions between PAS/AID and withdrawing lifesupport.
PAS/AID would be unnecessary if all patients had access to excellent palliative
care.
The medical profession should endorse PAS/AID as a morally valid medical
option.
Physicians who participate in PAS/AID thereby abandon their patients.
A patient’s request for PAS/AID should override the physician’s moral
objections to performing it.

The fifth section, “Physician Perspectives on Death,” contained statements about
physicians’ own mortality that could be answered using the same Likert scale. The
statements were the following:
•
•
•

I am comfortable talking with patients about death
My ability to think about my own mortality is relevant to providing good care for
patients at the end of life.
Medical professionals should never intentionally hasten a patient’s death at the
end of life.

This section also contained a question asking “ How often are you faced with end-of-life
issues in your daily practice?” that could be answered by selecting one of the following
choices: several times a week, every week, nearly every week, two to three times a
month, about once a month, several times a year, about once or twice a year, less than
once a year, or never. A final question asking, “If you think PAS/AID should be legal or
decriminalized but would be unwilling or unlikely to perform it yourself, please explain
why,” was included in the section and could be answered in a free response manner.
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The final section included demographic questions including age, preferred gender
identity (answered as free response), ethnicity, race, Veterans Affairs association,
percentage of practice involving patients who are underinsured or on Medicaid, and
medical specialty.
Survey Administration
We followed validated administration methods already described in the
literature.(9,21,22) We chose a random sample of 1000 practicing physicians (age 25-79)
from the American Medical Association Physician Masterfile, a database intended to
include all physicians in the United States. Five-hundred physicians were chosen at
random from all specialties, excluding pathology and radiology, and 500 were chosen
from specialties more likely to involve end-of-life care (geriatrics, pediatric critical care,
pulmonary and critical care, oncology, physical medicine and rehabilitation, and hospice
and palliative medicine). We used the services of the Yale Printing and Publishing for all
mailings. Each physician was assigned a number (1-1000), which was included on each
survey to maintain confidentiality while recording responses. In order to bolster response
rate, we mailed the questionnaire out three times (February 2018, April 2018, June 2018).
The final mailing included a note and a US$2 incentive to help bolster response rate.
Data Analysis
Data from hard copy surveys were input into excel files by two different
researchers to reduce input error. Answers using the Likert Scale were condensed into
“agree” (agree, strongly agree), “neural”, and “disagree” (disagree, strongly disagree).
Answers to how often physicians provided end-of-life care were condensed into “often”
(several times a week, every week, nearly every week), “sometimes” (two to three times
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a month, about once a month, several times a year), and “rarely” (about once or twice a
year, less than once a year, never). Age categories ((25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-75,
75+) were condensed into ≤54 and ≥55 years. Categories for percentages of patients who
were underinsured or on Medicaid (0-14, 15-29, 30-44, 45-59, 60-74, 75-89, 90-100)
were condensed into <30, 30-74, ≥75%. Regions where physicians practice were
determined by the following: Northeast (ME, MA, RI, CT, NH, VT, NY, PA, NJ, DE,
MD), Southeast (WV, VA, KY, TN, NC, SC, GA, AL, MS, AR, LA, FL), Midwest (OH,
IN, MI, IL, MO, WI, MN, IA, KS, NE, SD, ND), Southwest (TX, OK, NM, AZ), and
West (CO, WY, MT, ID, WA, OR, UT, NV, CA, AK, HI). All numerical data are
reported as percentages. Answers to the free response questions were coded to identify
common themes. In an attempt to account for our sampling method and make our results
more generalizable to the general population of US physicians, case weights were
assigned to percentages.(23) The case weights were determined by comparing the ratio of
specialties in our sample to that of the entire population of US physicians. Italicized
percentages reported in the “Results” and “Discussion” sections indicate that they are
case weighted.
Results
Survey Response Rate
Of the 1000 physicians who were mailed the survey, 61 came back as
undeliverable by the postal service. Those individuals were considered ineligible. At the
closure of data collection, we used a method described by Curlin et al. to determine the
approximate number of ineligible non-respondents.(21) Thirty respondents and 30 non-
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respondents were chosen in alphabetical order. The phone numbers for each were found
via a yellow pages Internet search. They were called and asked if they had received the
survey. Those who could be reached and did receive the survey were considered eligible.
Those who could not be reached or did not receive the survey were deemed ineligible. A
calculation was then used to determine approximately how many of the non-respondents
were ineligible. We were able to locate 29 out of the 30 (0.97) responders and 26 out of
the 30 (0.87) non-responders. We then estimated that 90% (1-[0.97-0.87]) of those who
did not respond (751) were eligible. Our estimated response rate of eligible physicians is
therefore 22% (188/[188 + 0.90*751]).
Demographics
Demographic information of the respondents is listed in Table 1. Eighty-three
(44%) were 54-years-old or under, and 91 (48%) were 55-years-old or older. Sixty (32%)
identified themselves as female, 99 (53%) as male, and 29 (15%) did not wish to specify.
With respect to ethnicity, 7 (4%) were Hispanic or Latino, and 164 (87%) were not. With
respect to race, 1 (1%) was Asian, 8 (4%) were East Asian/Pacific Islander, 6 (3%) were
South Asian, 2 (1%) were Other Asian, 8 (4%) were Black/African American, 1 (1%)
was American Indian/Alaskan Native, 133 (70%) were White/Caucasian, 7 (4%) were
other, and 6 (3%) did not wish to specify. With respect to specialty, 28 (15%) were
Internal Medicine, 30 (16%) were Family Medicine/Practice, 24 (13%) were Surgery, 12
(6%) were Psychiatry, 11 (6%) were Obstetrics/Gynecology, 3 (2%) were Neurology, 20
(11%) were Emergency Medicine, 8 (4%) were Anesthesia, 30 (16%) were Pediatrics,
and 8 (4) were other. Three (2%) practiced at a Veteran Affairs facility, and 171 (91%)
did not. With respect to the percentage of patients in physicians’ practices that were on
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Medicaid or underinsured, 92 (49%) had less than 30%, 62 (33%) had 30 to 74%, and 13
(7%) had greater than or equal to 75%. Forty (22%) practiced in the Northeast, 52 (28%)
in the Southeast, 46 (24%) in the Midwest, 15 (8%) in the Southwest, and 34 (18%) in the
West. With respect to how often physicians provided end-of-life care in their practices,
33 (18%) often did, 78 (41%) sometimes did, and 73 (39%) rarely did.
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Table 1. Characteristics of the 188 physicians who responded to the survey.
Age
≤54
≥55
Gender Identity
Female
Male
Do not wish to specify
Hispanic or Latino
Yes
No
Race
Asian
East Asian/Pacific Islander
South Asian
Other Asian
Black/African American
American Indian/Alaskan Native
White/Caucasian
Other
Do not wish to specify
Specialty
Internal Medicine
Family Medicine/Practice
Surgery
Psychiatry
Obstetrics/Gynecology
Neurology
Emergency Medicine
Anesthesia
Pediatrics
Other
Practice at Veteran Affairs facility
Yes
No
Percentage of patients in practice that are on Medicaid or underinsured
< 30
30-74
≥75
Region of practice
Northeast
Southeast
Midwest
Southwest
West
How often physicians provide end-of-life careB
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
A
Percentages do not add up to 100 due to incomplete survey data.
B
Data condensed from 9 to 3 categories.

n (%)A
83 (44)
91 (48)
60 (32)
99 (53)
29 (15)
7 (4)
164 (87)
1 (1)
8 (4)
6 (3)
2 (1)
8 (4)
1 (1)
133 (70)
7 (4)
6 (3)
28 (15)
30 (16)
24 (13)
12 (6)
11 (6)
3 (2)
20 (11)
8 (4)
30 (16)
8 (4)
3 (2)
171 (91)
92 (49)
62 (33)
13 (7)
40 (21)
52 (28)
46 (24)
15 (8)
34 (18)
33 (18)
78 (41)
73 (39)
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Legality of PAS
Table 2 shows the number of physicians who thought PAS should be legalized or
decriminalized. One-hundred and seven (57, 60%) physicians thought PAS should be
legal [78 (41, 38 %) illegal], and 125 (66, 69%) thought it should be decriminalized [60
(32, 30%) not decriminalized] in their respective states (Table 2).
Table 2. The number of physicians who thought PAS should be legalized or
decriminalized. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. Italicized percentages
are case weighted.
Yes
No
n
n
A
(%,%)
(%,%)A
Should PAS be legalized in your state?
107
78
(57,60)
(41,38)
Should PAS be decriminalized in your state?

125
(66,69)
A
Percentages do not add up to 100 due to incomplete survey data.

60
(32,30)

Table 3 shows the number of respondents who answered “yes”, “possibly”,
“unlikely”, or “never” when asked if they would perform PAS is it were legal in their
state. Fifteen (8, 9%) indicated “yes”, 42 (22, 25%) replied “possibly”, 62 (33, 32%) were
“unlikely” to, and 67 (36, 33%) would “never” (Table 3).
Table 3. The number of physicians who answered “yes”, “possibly”, “unlikely”, or
“never” when asked if they would perform PAS if it were legal in their state. “PAS” is an
abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. Italicized percentages are case-weighted
Yes
Possibly
Unlikely
Never
n
n
n
n
(%,%)A
(%,%)A
(%,%)A
(%,%)A
Would you perform PAS if it
were legal in your state?
15
42
62
67
(8,9)
(22,25)
(33,32)
(36,33)
A
Percentages do not add up to 100 due to incomplete survey data.
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Current Practices of PAS
Table 4 shows the number of participants who agreed, disagreed, or were neutral
when asked questions about the current practices of PAS in states where it is legal. When
asked, “Most patients who seek PAS/AID do so because of physical pain,” 81 (43, 49%)
physicians agreed, 40 (21, 24%) disagreed, and 63 (34, 26%) were neutral (Table 4).
When asked, “Current PAS/AID laws provide adequate safeguards, ” 99 (53, 58%)
agreed, 54 (29, 29%) disagreed, and 30 (16, 13%) were neutral (Table 4). When asked,
“Physicians who are not psychiatrists are sufficiently trained to screen for depression in
patients who are seeking PAS/AID,” 40 (21, 23%) agreed, 104 (55, 60%) disagreed, and
39 (21, 16%) were neutral (Table 4). When asked, “Most physicians can predict with
certainty whether a patient seeking PAS/AID has 6 months or less to live,” 31 (16, 18%)
agreed, 114 (61, 60%) disagreed, and 38 (20, 22%) were neutral (Table 4).
Table 4. Physicians’ responses to questions about the current practices of PAS in states
where it is legal. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. “AID” is an
abbreviation for aid-in-dying. Italicized percentages are case weighted.
Agree
Neutral Disagree
n
n
n
(%,%)A (%,%)A
(%,%)A
Most patients who seek PAS do so because of physical pain.
81
63
40
(43,49)
(34,26)
(21,24)
Current PAS laws provide adequate safeguards.
99
30
54
(53,58)
(16,13)
(29,29)
Physicians who are not psychiatrists are sufficiently trained
to screen for depression in patients who are seeking PAS.
40
39
104
(21,23)
(21,16)
(55,60)
Most physicians can predict with certainty whether a patient
seeking PAS/AID has 6 months or less to live.
31
38
114
(16,18)
(20,22)
(61,60)
A
Percentages do not add up to 100 due to incomplete survey data.
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Implications of PAS Legalization
Table 5 shows the number of participants who agreed, disagreed, or were neutral
when asked questions about several professional, social, economic, and legal
considerations if PAS were to become legalized nationally. When asked, “PAS/AID
would improve the clinical care of patients at the end-of-life,” 96 (51, 52%) agreed, 60
(32, 33%) disagreed, and 27 (14, 14%) were neutral (Table 5). When asked, “Patients
would view the medical profession more negatively, ” 46 (24, 26%) agreed, 82 (43, 43%)
disagreed, and 55 (29, 32%) were neutral (Table 5). When asked, “Patients would trust
their physicians more, ” 43 (23, 24%) agreed, 64 (34, 35%) disagreed, and 75 (40, 40%)
were neutral (Table 5).
When asked, “Racial and ethnic minorities would feel pressure to end their lives,”
20 (11, 9%) physicians agreed, 121 (64, 69%) disagreed, and 43 (23, 23%) were neutral
(Table 5). When asked, “Patients with lower socioeconomic status would feel pressure to
end their lives, ” 32 (17, 15%) physicians agreed, 106 (56, 58%) disagreed, and 46 (24,
25%) were neutral (Table 5). When asked, “Patients with mental or physical disabilities
would feel pressure to end their lives,” 50 (27, 24%) physicians agreed, 89 (47, 49%)
disagreed, and 45 (24, 26%) were neutral (Table 5).
When asked, “PAS/AID would save money for the health care system,” 107 (57,
62%) physicians agreed, 29 (15, 18%) disagreed, and 48 (26, 19%) were neutral (Table
5). When asked, “Health insurance companies would cover PAS/AID over more
expensive, possibly life-saving treatments, like chemotherapy,” 93 (49, 46%) physicians
agreed, 35 (19, 20%) disagreed, and 55 (29, 34%) were neutral (Table 5).

18
When asked, “PAS/AID would lead to an increased number of medical
malpractice suits,” 55 (29, 28%) agreed, 72 (38, 43%) disagreed, and 56 (30, 28%) were
neutral (Table 5). When asked, “PAS/AID would lead to an increase in suicides in the
community,” 68 (36, 32%) agreed, 87 (46, 51%) disagreed, 28 (15, 17%) were neutral
(Table 5). When asked, “PAS/AID would lead to the legalization of euthanasia,” 61 (32,
30%) physicians agreed, 71 (38, 43%) disagreed, and 52 (28, 26%) were neutral (Table
5).
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Table 5. Physicians’ responses to professional, social, economic, and legal considerations of the
national legalization of PAS. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. “AID” is an
abbreviation for aid-in-dying. Italicized percentages are case weighted.
Agree
Neutral Disagree
n
n
n
(%,%)A (%,%)A
(%,%)A
PAS/AID would improve the clinical care of patients at the
end-of-life.
96
27
60
(51,52)
(14,14)
(32,33)
Patients would view the medical profession more negatively
46
55
82
(24,26)
(29,32)
(43,43)
Patients would trust their physicians more.
43
75
64
(23,24)
(40,40)
(34,35)
Racial and ethnic minorities would feel pressure to end their
lives.
20
43
121
(11,9)
(23,23)
(64,69)
Patients with lower socioeconomic status would feel pressure
to end their lives.
32
46
106
(17,15)
(24,25)
(56,58)
Patients with mental or physical disabilities would feel
pressure to end their lives.
50
45
89
(27,24)
(24,26)
(47,49)
PAS would save money for the health care system.
107
48
29
(57,62)
(26,19)
(15,18)
Health insurance companies would cover PAS over more
expensive, possibly life-saving treatments, like chemotherapy.
93
55
35
(49,46)
(29,34)
(19,20)
PAS/AID would lead to an increased number of medical
malpractice suits.
55
56
72
(29,28)
(30,28)
(38,43)
PAS/AID would lead to an increase in suicides in the
community.
68
28
87
(36,32)
(15,17)
(46,51)
PAS would lead to the legalization of euthanasia.
61
52
71
(32,31)
(28,26)
(38,43)
A
Percentages do not add up to 100 due to incomplete survey data.

Other Considerations Regarding PAS
Table 6 shows the number of participants who agreed, disagreed, and were neutral
when asked questions about ethical considerations regarding the national legalization of
PAS. When asked “Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to relieve
suffering,” 120 (64, 65%) agreed, 49 (26, 28%) disagreed, and 16 (8, 6%) were neutral
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(Table 6). When asked, “Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to respect
patient autonomy,” 107 (57, 58%) agreed, 50 (27, 29%) disagreed, and 28 (15, 12%)
were neutral (Table 6).
When asked, “There are important ethical distinctions between PAS/AID and
withdrawing life-support,” 146 (78, 78%) agreed, 22 (12, 11%) disagreed, and 15 (8,
10%) were neutral (Table 6). When asked, “PAS/AID would be unnecessary if all
patients had access to excellent palliative care,” 64 (34, 38%) agreed, 80 (43, 45%)
disagreed, and 38 (20, 18%) were neutral (Table 6).
When asked, “The medical profession should endorse PAS/AID as a morally
valid medical option,” 89 (47, 49%) physicians agreed, 66 (35, 32%) disagreed, and 29
(15, 17%) were neutral (Table 6). When asked, “Physicians who participate in PAS/AID
thereby abandon their patients,” 16 (9, 13%) agreed, 144 (77, 76%) disagreed, and 23
(12, 10%) were neutral (Table 6). When asked, “A patient’s request for PAS/AID should
override the physician’s moral objections to performing it,” 37 (20, 20%) agreed, 123
(65, 68%) disagreed, and 25 (13, 15%) were neutral (Table 6).
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Table 6. Physicians’ responses to ethical considerations of the national legalization of PAS.
“PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. “AID” is an abbreviation for aid-in-dying.
Italicized percentages are case weighted.
Agree
Neutral Disagree
n
n
n
(%,%)A (%,%)A
(%,%)A
Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to
relieve suffering.
120
16
49
(64,65)
(8,6)
(26,28)
Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to
respect patient autonomy.
107
28
50
(57,58)
(15,12)
(27,29)
There are important ethical distinctions between PAS/AID
and withdrawing life-support.
146
15
22
(78, 78)
(8,10)
(12,11)
PAS/AID would be unnecessary if all patients had access to
excellent palliative care.
64
38
80
(34,38)
(20,18)
(43,45)
The medical profession should endorse PAS/AID as a morally
valid medical option.
89
29
66
(47,49)
(15,17)
(35,32)
Physicians who participate in PAS/AID thereby abandon
their patients.
16
23
144
(9,13)
(12,10)
(77,76)
A patient’s request for PAS/AID should override the
physician’s moral objections to performing it.
37
25
123
(20,20)
(13,15)
(65,68)
A
Percentages do not add up to 100 due to incomplete survey data.

Physician Perspectives on Death
Table 7 shows the number of participants who agreed, disagreed, and were neutral
when asked questions concerning their personal beliefs about death and its relevance to
the practice of medicine. When asked, “I am comfortable talking with patients about
death,” 156 (83, 83%) agreed, 13 (7, 6%) disagreed, and 16 (9, 10%) were neutral (Table
7). When asked, “My ability to think about my own mortality is relevant to providing
good care for patients at the end of life,” 155 (82, 81%) agreed, 12 (6, 11%) disagreed,
and 18 (10, 8%) were neutral (Table 7). When asked, “Medical professionals should
never intentionally hasten a patient’s death at the end of life,” 74 (39, 43%) physicians
agreed, 80 (43, 41 %) disagreed, and 30 (16, 15 %) were neutral (Table 7).
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Table 7. Physicians’ responses to questions concerning their personal beleifs about death and
its relevance to the practice of medicine. Italicized percentages are case weighted.
Agree
Neutral Disagree
n
n
n
(%,%)A (%,%)A
(%,%)A
I am comfortable talking with patients about death.
156
16
13
(83,83)
(9,10)
(7,6)
My ability to think about my own mortality is relevant to
providing good care for patients at the end of life.
155
18
12
(82,81)
(10,8)
(6,11)
Medical professionals should never intentionally hasten a
patient’s death at the end of life.
74
30
80
(39,43)
(16,15)
(43,41)
A
Percentages do not add up to 100 due to incomplete survey data.

Crosstabulations
Table 8 shows the crosstabulation of those who thought PAS should be legal or
decriminalized and how likely they would perform PAS if it were legal or decriminalized
in their state. Of those who thought PAS should be legal, 16 (15%) would, 40 (37%)
“possibly” would, 38 (36%) were “unlikely” to, and 13 (12%) would “never” perform it
(Table 8). Of those who thought PAS should be decriminalized, 16 (13%) would, 40
(32%) “possibly” would, 47 (37%) were “unlikely” to, and 23 (18%) would “never”
perform it (Table 8).
Table 8. The self-reported likelihood of physicians who thought PAS should be legal or
decriminalized performing PAS. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide.
If PAS were legal or decriminalized, would you participate in it?

Should PAS be legal
in your state?
Should PAS be
decriminalized in
your state?

“Yes”
n
(%)

“Possibly”
n
(%)

“Unlikely”
n
(%)

“Never”
n
(%)

16
(15)

40
(37)

38
(36)

13
(12)

16
(13)

40
(32)

47
(37)

23
(18)
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Table 9 shows the crosstabulation of those who thought PAS should be legal and
their responses to two questions concerning the ethics of PAS. Of those who thought PAS
should be legal, 84 (81%) agreed, 4 (4%) disagreed, and 16 (15%) were unsure when
asked, “The medical profession should endorse PAS/AID as a morally valid medical
option” (Table 9). Of those who thought PAS should be legal, 28 (27%) agreed, 66 (63%)
disagreed, and 11 (10%) were unsure when asked, “Medical professionals should never
intentionally hasten a patient’s death at the end of life” (Table 9).
Table 9. Physicians’, who thought PAS should be legal, responses to two ethical questions
regarding national PAS legalization. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide.
Agree
Neutral Disagree
n
n
n
(%)
(%)
(%)
The medical profession should endorse PAS/AID as a morally
valid medical option.
84
16
4
(81)
(15)
(4)
Medical professionals should never intentionally hasten a
patient’s death at the end of life.
28
11
66
(27)
(10)
(63)

Beliefs and Practices of PAS
Table 10 shows the free responses answers of physicians who were asked to
explain why they thought PAS should be legal or decriminalized but would be unwilling
or unlikely to perform the practice. The single most common reason given was lack of
training/expertise (47%) (Table 10). Other, less common themes were religious/spiritual
teachings (11%), should be an option for patients (8%), legal implications/hurdles (7%),
ethical/moral opposition to the practice of PAS (5%), PAS is rarely ever truly indicated
(5%), and could not personally perform PAS due to its inherent severity (4%) (Table 10).
Themes endorsed by only one respondent were the following: inadequate safeguards in
place, “great subtleties and greater responsibility involved in performing PAS/AID, “[I]
would favor smaller # physicians involved to ensure expertise in assessing
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appropriateness of PAS rather than general medical practitioners uniformly authorized to
do so,” and “I am afraid patient may have a scary face when dying” (Table 10).
Table 10. Free responses answers of physicians who were asked to explain why they thought
PAS should be legal or decriminalized but would be unwilling or unlikely to perform the
practice. “PAS” is an abbreviation for physician-assisted suicide. “AID” is an abbreviation for
aid-in-dying.
%
Lack of training/expertise
47
Spiritual/religious teachings
11
Should be option for patients
8
Legal implications/hurdles
7
Ethical/moral opposition to the practice of PAS
5
PAS is rarely every truly indicated
5
Could not personally perform PAS due to its inherent severity
4
Inadequate safeguards A
1
“Great subtleties and greater responsibility involved in performing PAS/AID” A
1
“I am afraid patient may have scary face when dying” A
1
“[I] would favor small [number of] physicians involved to endure expertise in
assessing appropriateness of PAS rather than general medical practitioners
uniformly authorized to do so.” A
1
A
Answer given by only one physician

Discussion
Legality, Beliefs, and Practices of PAS
This study shows that 60% of US physicians believe that PAS should be
legalized, which is consistent with previous Gallup poll results (57%) (Table 2).(6) We
also found that 69% of US physicians think the practice should be decriminalized, which
is a new finding (Table 2). With legalization, there would not be any penalties attributed
to the act of PAS. While, decriminalization of PAS would mean that there would no
longer be any criminal penalties of performing the act. Additionally, only 9% of
respondents indicated that they would unequivocally perform PAS if it were legal (Table
3). Of those who thought PAS should be legalized or decriminalized, only 15 and 13%
indicated that they would unequivocally be willing to perform the practice if it were legal
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or decriminalized, respectively, (Table 8). Furthermore, of those who thought PAS
should be legalized or decriminalized, 12% and 15% would “never” perform PAS,
respectively (Table 8). This discrepancy between the belief that PAS should be legalized
and the actual willingness to practice it if it were legal is consistent with findings in the
literature and our previous survey data from a large academic institution.(16,19)
In order to assess why this discrepancy persists, we asked those physicians who
thought PAS should be legal but would be unwilling to perform it to explain why in a
free response text box. The single most common response (47%) was a lack of training or
expertise with respect to PAS since it was outside the scope of their practice (Table 10).
The next most common themes were religious/spiritual teachings (11%), should be an
option for patients (8%), legal implications/hurdles (7%), ethical/moral opposition to the
practice of PAS (5%), PAS is rarely ever truly indicated (5%), and could not personally
perform PAS due to its inherent severity (4%) (Table 10).
Several conclusions can be inferred from these responses. The first is that
religion/spiritual teachings play a role in physicians’ decisions about performing PAS,
which has been consistently shown to be the case in the literature.(11,21) The second is
that ethics and morals are important in physicians’ decisions. Several respondents
invoked the Hippocratic oath and “do no harm” as to why they would not perform PAS.
This is not surprising as one of the oldest and most consistently used arguments of those
opposed to PAS is that it goes against the physician credo of “to do no harm.”(24) Next,
some physicians are unlikely to perform PAS due to fear of legal action taken against
them should they perform the practice. The fourth and arguably most interesting
conclusion can be drawn from the answers indicating PAS being outside the scope of
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physicians’ practices, its inherent severity, and that it should be an option for patients. It
is clear from these responses that physicians think that patients should have the option to
choose PAS; however, the doctors would be unwilling to perform it because it is outside
the scope of their practice. On the one hand, this unwillingness could be due to a lack of
training or expertise with respect to PAS. Perhaps if some of these physicians had
specific training in performing PAS, they would be more willing to perform it, which
some respondents did explicitly state. Our sample also had a large percentage of
pediatricians, which likely lead to an increase in this reason since PAS is never a
consideration for their practice in the US. On the other hand, it could simply be an
indication that physicians think patients should have the option to PAS without any real
internal exploration of why they think it should be an option for patients but would not
personally want to perform it. It is easier to simply say that it is outside their scope of
practice than it would be to address a potential internal discrepancy between belief and
willingness to practice.
Underlying many of these “outside of specialty” responses is likely a feeling
toward the inherent severity of PAS, which 5% of respondents explicitly identified. This
feeling is explained quite well by Robert Burt when he writes about “ambivalence”
toward death. He argues that although it is conceivable that death can be a moral good or
at least morally neutral in some cases, there exists a pervasive sense that death is wrong
or a “moral error.”(25) Burt writes, “We cannot readily erase a persistent contrapuntal
conviction that death…is inherently wrong.”(25) Our data seem to suggest that
physicians today generally want their patients to have control over their deaths, but
physicians remain uncertain about their own participation.(19) This ambivalence is
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further supported by the finding that of those who thought PAS should be legal, 27%
agreed that, “Medical professionals should never intentionally hasten death at the end of
life” (Table 9).
Current Practices of PAS
When asked about current practices of PAS in states where it is legal, only 24 %
of physicians disagreed (49% agree; 26% neutral) that the most common reason for
patients seeking PAS is physical pain (Table 4). The data about the practice of PAS in
Oregon from Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act indicate that most patients who seek PAS
do so because of loss of autonomy and being less able to engage in activities that make
life enjoyable and not because of physical pain.(26) In fact, physical pain is not even in
the top five reasons why patients seek PAS. This finding suggests that physicians in
general are misinformed as to why patients seek PAS at the end of life.
When asked about current safeguards, most physicians (59%) agreed that they are
adequate (Table 4). This is a larger percentage than previously reported in the literature.
A study from Oregon found that only 37% of emergency medicine physicians thought
that the Oregon initiative had adequate safeguards.(14) When asked about specific
safeguards, however, physicians were less sure. Sixty percent of respondents disagreed
that a physician other than a psychiatrist could effectively screen a patient seeking PAS
for depression (Table 4). Furthermore, 60% disagreed that most physicians can
adequately predict if a patient seeking PAS has 6 months or less to live (Table 4).
These results have important implications. First, physicians in general doubt that
doctors who are not psychiatrists can adequately screen patients seeking PAS for
depression. Most patients who ask for PAS have a diagnosis of terminal cancer.(26) A
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study of cancer patients showed that of those who had a desire to die, 59% had depressive
syndromes. Of those patients who did not have a desire to die, only 8% had depressive
syndromes.(27) Thus, there is evidence to suggest that many patients with terminal
cancer who seek death have depression. The data from Oregon, however, indicate that
less than five percent of patients seeking PAS are evaluated by a psychiatrist.(26) If the
majority of patients seeking PAS have terminal cancer, and most terminal cancer patients
desiring death have signs of depressive syndromes, then more than five percent of
patients seeking PAS should be evaluated by psychiatrists. It seems that physicians who
responded to this survey are right to doubt the effectiveness of this specific safeguard.
Indeed, a study from Oregon has found that of those patients who received a lethal
medical for terminal illness, 1 in 6 had clinical depression.(28)
The second implication of these findings is that prognosis as a safeguard is
fraught with inadequacies. Respondents in general disagree that most physicians can
accurately predict if a patient seeking PAS has 6 months or less to live. These opinions
are supported by the literature. Physicians are generally hesitant to provide lifeexpectancies to patients because they think they are challenging to predict because it is
“difficult” and “stressful”.(29) Furthermore, a recent study found that only 57% of
physicians were accurate when predicting a patient had six months or less to live.(30)
Taken together, it is clear that both the opinions of physicians and the literature support
the ineffectiveness of current safeguards used to protect patients with mental illness and
longer prognoses who are seeking PAS.
It should be noted as well that prognosis is dependent on the willingness of a
patient to accept treatment. A patient with insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus who
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refuses insulin will be dead in less than six months. Though this patient is not “terminal”
in the classic sense, she would qualify for PAS under the current laws. This is a large
loophole in arguably the most important safeguard of current PAS laws.
Implications of PAS Legalization
A slight majority (52%) of physicians thought PAS legalization would improve
the clinical care of patients at the end of life, while a third (33%) thought it would not
(Table 5). Respondents were more likely to disagree when asked if the medical
profession would be viewed more negatively (26% agreed, 43% disagreed, 32% neutral)
and if patients would trust their physicians more (24% agreed, 35% disagreed, 40%
neutral) if PAS were legalized (Table 5).
Most physicians disagreed that patients of lower socioeconomic status, racial or
ethnic minorities, and those with mental or physical disabilities would feel pressure to
end their lives through PAS (58, 69, 49%, respectively) (Table 5). These opinions are
supported by at least one study, which found that there was no heightened risk for abuse
of PAS in populations based on race/ethnicity, income, and disabilities.(31) Though there
is evidence supporting the unbiased nature of the practices of PAS, it is still important to
continue monitoring for bias in states where it is newly legalized. The data for the
aforementioned article comes from Oregon, which is a predominately white state.
Patients have historically been discriminated against based on race throughout the history
if the practice of medicine, and there is no reason to assume that PAS would be any
different than other practices in medicine.(32) Furthermore, those in the disability
community have consistently been vocal about their fears of abuse with respect to
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PAS.(33) These concerns must be heard and routinely evaluated to ensure safe practices
of PAS.
With respect to economic ramifications of legalization of PAS, most physicians
(62 %) thought it would save the healthcare system money. This is consistent with
findings from a recent article published in Canada that suggested that the Canadian
healthcare system could save as much as 140 million dollars through the use of PAS.(34)
Additionally, nearly half of physicians (46%) thought that the legalization would lead to
health insurance companies preferentially covering the cost of PAS over more expensive,
life-saving treatments like chemotherapy (Table 5). The US desperately needs to control
its healthcare spending. Indeed, in 2010, one quarter of all Medicare spending was
attributed to the last year of life.(35) It is apparent that any practice that effectively
shortens the length of end-of-life care will likely decrease the cost of healthcare
nationwide.
The question, however, is how medicine as a profession wants to cut spending.
Do we set the precedent of providing the means for patients to kill themselves by
legalizing PAS to lower costs with the possibility of creating an environment where
insurance companies favor paying for PAS rather than more expensive treatments? Or do
we strive for an intellectually more difficult and laborious process of examining how we
as a profession view death and dying in order to create an environment where death is not
a crisis from which a patient must be rescued?(36)
When asked about legal concerns, the majority of respondents (43%) disagreed
that the legalization of PAS would lead to an increase of medical malpractice suits (Table
5). This is logical as the current PAS laws have protections for physicians against
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malpractice suits. A majority disagreed (51%, 32% agreed) that the national legalization
of PAS would lead to increased number of suicides in the community. This is the
opposite of what is reported in the literature. The Werther effect, also known as copycat
suicide, is the phenomenon that a widely publicized suicide increases the rate of suicides
thereafter.(37) A recent study examined this effect with respect to PAS legalization and
found a 6.3% increase in statewide suicide rates (assisted and non-assisted) in states
where PAS has been legalized.(38) The association is correlative and not causative, but it
is an important consideration nonetheless when thinking about the legalization of PAS.
The last question in this section assesses what physicians think about the “slippery
slope” argument, which will be explained in detail in Part II of this thesis. A slight
majority (43%) disagreed that the legalization of PAS would lead to the legalization of
euthanasia, while about a third (30%) agreed (26% neutral) (Table 5). The respondents
seem to be relatively split on this topic, which is similar to the climate in the US in
general. There are many who proclaim that the slippery slope will never happen in
America, while others use it as strong justification against the legalization of PAS.(39)
Indeed, many physicians refer to countries like Belgium and the Netherlands where both
PAS and euthanasia have been legalized as realization of the slippery slope
argument.(40) There was a motion recently bought up in the Oregon Senate to allow
individuals identified by a power of attorney to administer the lethal drugs to the
terminally ill patient if that patient no longer had the capacity to administer it
themselves.(41) Furthermore, on January 15, 2019, a bill was introduced in the New
Mexico house entitled the “Elizabeth Whitefield End of Life Option Act.” This would
make PAS legal in New Mexico and expand the inclusion criteria. The bill does not
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require a patient to “self-administer” and allows patients with mental illnesses to request
PAS.(42) This is certainly evidence that the slippery slope argument does have merit in
the US and must be considered.

Other Considerations Regarding PAS
Sixty-five percent agreed that PAS is sometimes necessary to relieve suffering,
and 58% agreed that it is sometimes necessary to respect patient autonomy (Table 6). The
former finding is similar to previous data at a large academic institution, which found that
73% of physicians agreed that it is sometimes necessary to hasten death through PAS to
relieve suffering.(19) The latter supports the conclusion mentioned above that in general
physicians think that patients should have the right to choose to end their lives through
PAS.
Seventy-eight percent agreed that there are important ethical distinctions between
PAS and withdrawing life support (Table 6). This accords with current practice and ethics
of end-of-life care in the US, which acknowledges this distinction to be true.
Furthermore, most (68%) disagreed that a patient’s request for PAS should override the
physician’s moral objections to performing it (Table 6). This is in agreement with the
understanding in medicine that physicians are moral agents, and society and patients must
respect this.(43) Interestingly, physicians were more undecided than expected when
asked if the medical profession should endorse PAS as a morally valid medical option.
Forty-nine percent agreed, 32% disagreed, and 17% were unsure (Table 6). Once again, a
discrepancy is present—although 60% think PAS should be decriminalized, only 49%
think it is a morally valid medical option (Table 1, Table 6). Furthermore, of those who
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thought PAS should be legal, 81% agreed that PAS should be endorsed by the medical
profession as a morally valid option (Table 9). Nineteen percent disagreed or were unsure
if the medical profession should endorse PAS, but they still think it should be legal.
The vast majority of respondents (76%) disagreed that physicians who participate
in PAS abandon their patients (Table 6). They were split when asked if PAS would be
unnecessary if patients had access to excellent palliative care (38% agreed, 45%
disagreed) (Table 6). The latter question was asked because it could be argued that if
patients had access to the best palliative care, which would include biological, social,
spiritual, and psychological care, a practice like PAS would never be needed—or at least
rarely needed. Since most concerns of patients seeking PAS are existential, if time was
taken to work through those thoughts, feelings, and preparations, perhaps patients would
not need a practice like PAS.(26)
Physician Perspectives on Death
This section was given to respondents to get a sense of how important they
thought talking and thinking about death was in their daily practices. Eighty-three percent
agreed that they were comfortable talking with patients about death, and 81% agreed that
their ability to think about their own mortality was relevant to providing good care for
patients at the end of life (Table 7). These are promising findings. In order to be able to
actively and effectively talk with patients about death, one must be able to think about
and discuss their own mortality with his or herself.
The final result, which was briefly mentioned above, further supports the
existence of an inconsistency in physicians’ beliefs and practices. Respondents were
almost exactly split down the middle when asked if medical professionals should never
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intentionally hasten a patient’s death at the end of life (43% agreed, 41% disagreed)
(Table 7). When this data was correlated with data about legality of PAS, it revealed that
27% of those that thought PAS should be legal agreed that medical professionals should
never intentionally hasten death (Table 9).
Strengths and Limitations
The strength in our study lies in the breadth and novelty of the questions in our
survey tool. We also sent the survey to a generous sample (1000) of random physicians
from around the US.
Our analysis is limited by the survey tool used, low response rate, and small n.
Although the specific questions were vetted for clarity and simplicity, it is likely that
some of the questions could have been interpreted in more than one way decreasing the
accuracy of our analysis. This has indeed been shown to be the case in the literature
specifically with surveys based on physicians’ attitudes surrounding assisted suicide.(44)
Our response rate is lower than the average for surveys of physicians (54%); thus, it is
likely that there is a degree of non-respondent bias.(45) Although non-respondent bias is
likely less important than other sources of bias, 22% is a low response rate, which will
inevitably engender some non-respondent bias. It is unclear why our response rate was
this low as we used a validated survey administration technique that routinely produced
response rates of around 60%.(9,21,22) Possible explanations could be the length of this
survey and the use of a $2 incentive instead of the reported $20 in the final survey
mailing. Our small n decreases the overall generalizability of our study, although
randomization and case weights were used to counter this.
Conclusion
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Our results suggest that there are several important aspects of physicians’
perspectives surrounding the national legalization of PAS. The first is that there is a
discrepancy between belief and willingness to practice PAS. Although the majority of
physicians agreed that it should be legalized, only a small portion of those would
unequivocally perform the practice if it were legal. Furthermore, our data indicate that
this incongruity between belief and practice could be attributed to 1) a general
misunderstanding on the part of physicians as to why patients seek PAS, 2) a lack of
training or expertise with PAS, and 2) an inherent discomfort with the practice due to its
intimate relationship with death. A second finding is that physicians believe the current
safeguards protect patients, but when asked about the specific aspects of these safeguards,
they question their adequacy. Most notably, 60% of respondents thought that physicians
could not adequately determine if a patient seeking PAS had 6 months or less to live,
which is arguably the most important safeguard in place. Third, physicians are still wary
of the proverbial “slippery slope.” Not only do about a third of the physicians think that
PAS legalization would lead to euthanasia, but nearly half believe that health insurance
companies would preferentially cover PAS over more expensive, potentially life-saving
treatments like chemotherapy.
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Part II: Bioethical Analysis
Introduction
Physician-assisted suicide (PAS), also known as aid-in-dying, is currently legal in
seven states, decriminalized in one, and illegal in forty-two. As it is increasingly
becoming an option for physicians and patients, it is important to determine if this is
something that is morally permissible for physicians to offer. In this paper, I will provide
an argument against the legalization of PAS by showing that it is morally impermissible
according to four commonly invoked bioethical considerations: role morality, the
“slippery slope,” doing vs. allowing, and foreseeing vs. intending.
PAS is defined as a physician prescribing a lethal dose of drugs that patients may
then administer themselves with the intention of ending their lives. This practice is
distinct from euthanasia, in which a physician directly administers a drug or drugs with
the intention of ending the patient’s life. I will only be addressing PAS in this paper.
Role Morality
I will first use role morality arguments to justify my position against the national
legalization of PAS. In order to provide a robust argument, I will use David Luban’s
formulation to show that a physician’s role morality precludes a physician from
participating in PAS.
Before tackling the formulation, it is beneficial to describe role morality. Briefly,
it is the idea that when one holds a certain role, such as a lawyer, physician, or engineer,
one will be granted a different set of moral oughts/obligations/codes than the common
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morality of the general public. For example, due to the physician’s role, she has a
different obligation to disclose confidential information than someone from the general
public. While one would ordinarily be required by law to disclose pertinent information
about someone in a criminal trial, a physician, asked to disclose similar information that
she obtained in her professional role, would be obligated to non-disclosure by the sanctity
that the medical profession puts on the physician-patient relationship. But from where
does role morality come? How is it built? And, what are its limits? Luban provides some
answers.
Luban describes role morality with what he calls, “the Fourfold Root of Sufficient
Reasoning.”(46) This offers a scaffold that dissects role morality into four links that
consecutively build upon each other. The first link is the “institution,” then “roles,”
followed by “role obligations,” and finally “role acts.”(46) Using a physician treating a
patient with heart failure as an example, the medical profession would be the institution;
physician would be the role; providing evidence-based care would be the role obligation;
and prescribing an Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme (ACE) inhibitor would be the role
act. Luban also explains that each of these links is related to each other in a specific way.
He writes,
…the agent (1) justifies the institution by demonstrating its moral
goodness; (2) justifies the role by appealing to the structure of the
institution; (3) justifies the role obligations by showing that they are
essential to the role; and (4) justifies the role act by showing that the
obligations require it.(46)
Thus, the physician in my previous example justifies the medical profession because of
its moral goodness (the profession seeks to heal individuals). She justifies her role as a
physician because that is a role the medical profession has identified to be useful.
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Furthermore, she justifies the role obligation to treat with evidence-based medicine
because that is essential to being an effective physician. And finally, she justifies the role
act of prescribing an ACE inhibitor because the role obligation requires her to treat with
medications that are evidence based, which ACE inhibitors are.
Luban then goes on to explain how this model can be used to justify a role act if it
is contrary to common morality. He describes two possible ways of using this model, one
he terms the minimal-threshold test and the other, the cumulative-weight test.(46) In the
former, a role act is justified if the former three links are justified, even if only weakly.
This is an all or nothing approach and the strength of justifications of each link does not
matter. It only matters that they are justified. Luban (rightly, I think) abandons this for the
cumulative-weight test, which takes into account the strengths of the justifications of each
link when assessing if a role act contrary to common morality is permissible.
Thus, with an understanding of the Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning and the
cumulative-weight test we can apply it to the role act of a physician not participating in
PAS. In this case, the institution and role are the medical profession and physician,
respectively. With respect to the role obligation and role act, the former is the obligation
to “do no harm,” and the latter is the act of not participating in PAS.
The role obligation to “do no harm” has been a principle of medicine since its
inception. It is arguably the most crucial element of medicine and enables the sanctity
and trust of the physician-patient relationship. By acting against this principle, physicians
directly undermine this core relationship and the trust of patients in their doctors,
ultimately resulting in a deterioration of the profession. With respect to the case of PAS
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then, the role obligation to do no harm should be upheld, and a physician should not
participate in the act of PAS.
One possible argument against my claim includes the role of moral
acknowledgement. Role of moral acknowledgment refers to the duty of a professional to
respond to others, even if it is in violation of professional duties.(46) For example, it is
permissible for a psychiatrist to divulge confidential information about a patient if it
would result in the prevention of harm to others. The psychiatrist must violate her
obligation of confidentiality as a physician in order to prevent harm to another individual.
Indeed, this is exactly what the courts ruled in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California. (47) One might also suggest that a physician must use moral acknowledgment
to respect patient autonomy (or beneficence/relief of suffering) over the obligation to “do
no harm” when a patient requests PAS.
I am not arguing that the role of moral acknowledgment is unnecessary in
medicine. It is absolutely required in certain circumstances. Moreover, I believe that the
obligation to respect patient autonomy or beneficence/relief of suffering can override the
obligation to “do no harm” (surgery, for example). But, when the questions of respect for
autonomy/beneficence and moral acknowledgment drive a physician to respect those
principles by guiding and providing the means for patients to kill themselves, the
principle of “do no harm” must trump the others. The physician has an ample amount of
tools (palliative care, hospice care, religious/spiritual services, social workers, etc.) in the
tool kit to be beneficent and relieve suffering. One does not need to resort to prescribing a
lethal dose of barbiturates so the patient can committing suicide to achieve those goals.
As a final note, although PAS would not be morally justified for physicians to perform
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based on the argument I have presented with respect to the physician’s role morality,
there may be other roles in society where this practice might be acceptable (i.e.
thanatologists or others outside the medical profession).
The “Slippery Slope”
The “slippery slope” argument has routinely been used as an argument against the
legalization of PAS in the United States. Briefly, the slippery slope argument states that
once a certain norm is accepted it will inevitably lead to the acceptance of a morally illicit
norm. For the present case, the argument would be that legalization of PAS will
inevitably lead to the legalization of euthanasia. For the purposes of this argument, I am
assuming that taking of human life, except possibly in self-defense or to defend another,
is illicit. It is true that not all slippery slopes are considered equal, and there are important
considerations. How many “steps” is the initial norm from the morally illicit one? How
steep is the slope (how fast would the acceptance of the morally illicit occur)? And how
exactly does one get from one already morally questionable norm (in the case of PAS) to
the more morally illicit norm (euthanasia)? What are the factors that influence this
transformation?
Eugene Volokh and David Newman’s description of the slippery slope can
adequately address these questions. They break down the slippery slope into four distinct
mechanisms: cost-saving, “attitude-altering”, changing of political powers, and
“desensitization”.(48) The cost-saving mechanism is straightforward and it follows that
once the initial step is taken the morally illicit step becomes economically easier and
more feasible. One example they use to explain this involves gun registration. The
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slippery slope is the following: if a law is passed that mandates all gun owners to register
their firearms, it will lead to the government confiscating personal firearms, which is the
morally illicit norm. The initial step, gun registration, would require the design and
implementation of an incredibly expensive and complicated registration system. Once
this step is complete, however, the economic barrier has been hurdled. It becomes
exceedingly easy and inexpensive for the government to confiscate guns because the
costly registration system already exists.(48)
It is just as easy to imagine this playing a large role in the slippery slope from
PAS legalization to euthanasia legalization. The act of PAS is much cheaper for
insurance companies than expensive, possibly life-saving treatments like chemotherapy.
Indeed, this is what happened to Stephanie Packer in California. As her scleroderma
progressed, her doctors thought that switching to another chemotherapy drug would
provide an extension of life. The insurance company however denied her claim for
chemotherapy but did approve the cost of a prescription for life-ending drugs—with a copayment of $1.20.(49)
The second mechanism is “attitude-altering.” This generally relies on what laws
say rather than what they do. If something is law, then individuals will tend to think that
it ought to be law.(48) The example given by Volokh and Newman refers to the Patriot
Act. When lawmakers were considering this legislation, which would allow the
government to track email addresses and websites that an individual used or visited, they
cited the “pen register” as a precedent. This was a Supreme Court ruling twenty years
prior that approved the monitoring of telephone numbers in a similar way. When
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lawmakers referred to the pen register, they did not consider the merits of the law itself
but accepted it as something that ought to be law because it was law.(48)
This mechanism is certainly applicable to the legalization of PAS. One can
imagine that if PAS is legalized, it might follow that many people will think it ought to be
legal since it is law. Then, when considering legalizing euthanasia, the merits of the
legalization of PAS will not be considered for it is already law. Since, ostensibly,
euthanasia is not that different from PAS, it will be easier to legalize euthanasia. This is
highlighted in a famous New Yorker article entitled, “The Death Treatment” about a
euthanasia case of depressed woman in Belgium named Godelieva. The author writes
that, “Until Godelieva’s death, Tom [her son] had never given much thought to
euthanasia…He assumed that the law was for old people who were already dying. Now it
seemed to Tom that there were few people reflecting critically on the law.”(50)
Acceptance of the first step could also lead to changes in the power of political
groups, the third mechanism by which Volokh and Newman explain slippery slope. The
example they use is the legalization of marijuana. The slippery slope here is that if
marijuana is legalized, advertising for marijuana will be legalized and consumption will
increase. One can imagine that if marijuana were legalized, it would open up a multibillion dollar industry. The money from this industry could then be used to fund powerful
lobbies in Washington that could influence Washington to push for legislation to legalize
marijuana advertising. Once this legislation passed congress, the increased exposure of
individuals to marijuana through advertising could ultimately increase consumption.(48)
Indeed, adult consumption of marijuana has slightly increased in Colorado since
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legalization.(51) The unintentional exposure of pediatric patients to marijuana has also
steadily increased in Colorado since legalization.(52)
While it is certainly unlikely that the legalization of PAS will unleash a multibillion dollar industry, one can imagine its legalization changing powers of certain
political groups. Consider, for example, the disability community and Compassion and
Choices, the oldest and best-funded non-profit organization supporting national
legalization, as examples of two opposing political groups. The disability community is,
on the whole, one of the largest outspoken opponents of legalization of PAS. One could
imagine that if PAS were to be legalized nationally, the political power of Compassion
and Choices might increase further. They would become champions of the law (and as
mentioned above, if something is law, it must ought to be law). This might afford them
more power and a larger voice than that of the disability community. With this newfound
power, they could push for broader inclusion criteria for physician-assisted-suicide and
ultimately legalization of euthanasia. Though there is no data available at the moment to
support this claim, it is still an important consideration especially since the acceptance of
PAS is increasing nationally.
Volokh and Newman refer to the final mechanism as “desensitization.” This is the
idea that people will focus on big changes but ignore the small ones.(48) The parable of
the boiling frog illustrates this well. If a frog is tossed into boiling water, it will
immediately jump out. If the frog is placed in a pot of water at room temperature while
the heat is gradually increasing, however, the frog will get cooked. When applied to
people this means that individuals will not devote much mental energy to small policy
changes. They reserve this mental energy for larger decisions.(48)
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This mechanism is certainly applicable to the slippery slope of legalization of
PAS. One can imagine little changes to the inclusion criteria for eligibility of
participating in the practice. Why six months to live and not seven? Why not eight, nine,
twelve? It is unlikely that people will pay attention to these little policy changes. What
about extending PAS to those individuals with terminal illness who are unable to move?
Why should those individuals not have the opportunity to participate in this practice just
because they physically are unable to administer the medication themselves? In this case
a physician would have to directly administer the medication, which would be euthanasia.
This would be a minor (practically, certainly not ethically) policy change to which people
may not pay much attention, and it could set the precedent for legalization of euthanasia.
The most obvious counterargument to the claims I have just made is that there are
adequate safeguards in place in the United States, thus we will not slip down the slope to
euthanasia legalization. Furthermore, that fact that we are not “like” the European
countries that have passed euthanasia laws is also invoked as an argument against a
slippery slope. It is true that when opponents of PAS legalization invoke the slippery
slope argument they almost exclusively refer to what has happened in the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Canada. Certainly, after twenty years of the Death with Dignity Act in
Oregon, there are no currently reported data of “slippery slope” examples occurring in
Oregon. That being said, it is a bit presumptuous and naïve to think that just because the
United States is the United States we will not slide down that slippery slope. Indeed, as
mentioned in Part I, there was recently a motion put forth in the legislation in Oregon to
allow euthanasia for immobilized, terminally ill patients since they could not themselves
administer a lethal dose of medication.(41) This was voted down, but there is now a new

45
bill in New Mexico that would expand the inclusion criteria of patients who are able to
seek PAS, which was mentioned in more detail in Part I.(42) The fact that both of these
bills have been introduced to state legislatures is evidence that the slippery slope is
relevant in the US and is an important consideration. Moreover, it certainly should not be
assumed that medicine will necessarily take the moral high ground. The history of
medicine is plagued with discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual
orientation. One need only look to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study to understand medicine’s
susceptibility to flawed moral and ethical judgment and disrespect for human rights.(53)
But, what about the safeguards in place? Surely they will prevent the plunge down
the slippery slope. As mentioned above, through “desensitization” these safeguards could
be incrementally changed to expand the inclusion criteria for those seeking PAS.
Additionally, it is unclear if these safeguards are working as intended. As mentioned in
Part I, recent data from Oregon indicate that of those seeking PAS, less than five percent
receive a formal psychiatric evaluation from a psychiatrist.(26) We know that most
people seeking PAS have terminal cancer, and a large portion of cancer patients have
depression. Thus, it is unlikely that only less than five percent of those who seek PAS
should be receiving a formal psychiatric evaluation.
Doing vs. Allowing
The next argument commonly invoked with regard to the legalization of PAS is
the distinction between “doing” and “allowing”. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s take on
Philippa Foot’s famous Trolley Problem classically exemplifies this distinction. The
scenario is as follows: There is a trolley with broken brakes hurtling down a track, and it
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will inevitably run over and kill five people if nothing is done. Someone who is watching
this happen notices a switch next to the track. If she flips this switch, the train will be
diverted onto another track. This track however has one person on it who will be killed if
the trolley is diverted (Figure 1). Is it morally permissible for the woman to flip the
switch? In the second scenario, the conditions are the same, except a man atop a bridge is
watching this train hurtling down the track on course to kill five people. He is standing
next to a man of such significant proportions that if he is pushed in front of the train, he
will stop the train but die in the process (Figure 2). Is it morally permissible for the
bystander to push the man in front of the train? The intuitive answer to this question is
always that the first is permissible but the second is impermissible. But why is this the
case? Ostensibly, it seems that both scenarios are equivalent.

Figure 1. Trolley Problem First Scenario.(54)

Figure 2. Trolley Problem Second Scenario.(55)
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Foot explains this moral intuition with positive and negative duties.(56) On the
one hand, negative duties are those in which it is required to refrain from doing harm. On
the other hand, positive duties are those that require one to assist with those in distress. In
the trolley example, the negative duty is to refrain from killing the one, while the positive
duty is to save the lives of the five. Foot indicates that negative duties carry more moral
stringency than do positive duties.(56) But why is this the case? Thomson addresses this
by invoking the distinction between diverting and introducing a threat. In the first
scenario, the threat of the trolley is simply being diverted from five people to one. There
is no introduction of an additional threat in this case—the threat is merely diverted to
fewer people. In the second scenario, the threat of the trolley killing five can only be
stopped by pushing the man onto the tracks. In this case, a threat that had not been there
previously—the man being pushed onto the tracks and dying—is introduced. Thus, she
believes it is morally acceptable to divert a threat that is already present to save the lives
of the five, but it is morally unacceptable to introduce a new threat to one to save the
lives of the five.(56) Thus, it seems that it requires considerably more moral justification
to override negative duties than it does for positive ones.
In the first scenario, the woman pulling the lever must decide between two
negative duties. She must refrain from killing five or refrain from killing one, which is an
easy moral choice, so she may flip the switch. In the second scenario, the man must
decide between a negative duty to refrain from killing the man and a positive duty to save
the five. Because there is more moral stringency on negative duties, the man must refrain
from killing the man rather than save the five.(56)
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I can now apply this to the distinction between withdrawing life-support and PAS.
In the case of withdrawing life-support, the physician has a positive duty to respect her
patient’s autonomy to refuse treatment and a positive duty to relieve suffering. There is
really no choice in this case because each are positive duties that are certainly morally
permissible; thus, the act of withdrawing life-support is permissible. With respect to PAS,
the positive duties of respecting patient autonomy and relief of suffering are pitted against
a negative duty to refrain from killing. As negative duties carry more stringency, it is
morally impermissible for the physician to override the negative duty of refraining from
killing and offer PAS to satisfy the positive duties of respect for patient autonomy and
relief of suffering. One might claim that the physician who withdraws life-support
precipitates the patient’s death, which would override the negative duty of refraining
from killing. But, the physician is not introducing a new threat in this case—the
underlying disease actively killing the patient is already present and removal of lifesupport allows the natural disease process to take its course. In the case of PAS, the
physician is introducing a new threat by prescribing a lethal dose of medication to patient
so they can commit suicide—a threat that was not there prior to involvement by the
physician.
I would now like to address some additional arguments that James Rachels puts
forth with regard to the distinction between withdrawing life support and euthanasia. His
position is that there is no important distinction between the two.(57) Although he
explicitly writes about euthanasia, his arguments can easily be applied to PAS. His first
argument involves an example of a man with incurable throat cancer who wishes to
remove all life-sustaining treatments. In doing so, Rachels argues, the physician actually
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increases suffering because it may take longer for the patient to die than if
euthanasia/PAS were used. He indicates that this is in direct contradiction to the premise
that drives removal of life-sustaining treatment in the first place, namely relief of
suffering. While it is true that removing life-sustaining measures compared to that of
euthanasia/PAS may prolong the dying process, adequate pain control is still available
and feasible. Although it is unlikely that physicians can completely control pain during
the dying process, they can almost always adequately address it. Thus, while the dying
process may be longer, it is not necessarily a “suffering” process due to physical pain—
although there may still be a large component of “existential” suffering, and there are
certainly other ways to ameliorate this suffering rather than suicide.
More importantly, however, the goal of removal of life-sustaining treatment is not
primarily the relief of suffering—it is driven by the recognition that there is little to no
benefit from continued aggressive intervention. Although it is routinely the case that
there is relief of suffering by withdrawing care, it is not the primary intention. Rather, the
intention is to remove burdensome care that is no longer efficacious—the benefit of the
treatment no longer outweighs the negatives of receiving the treatment. This is unlike
PAS in which the primary intention is to relieve suffering by killing the patient. The idea
of intention with respect to PAS will be explored more thoroughly in the following
section.
His next argument, which I think is more robust, is his claim that killing is no
morally worse than letting die.(57) He uses two cases to support his claim. In the first,
Smith will get a large inheritance if his six-year-old cousin dies. One night, while his
cousin is taking a bath, Smith enters the bathroom, drowns his cousin, and arranges
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things to make it look like an accident. In the second case, Jones stands to gain the same
inheritance and plans to kill his cousin in the same way Smith did. When Jones walks in
to the bathroom, however, his cousin is already drowning and Jones lets his cousin
“accidently” drown. The two cases are identical except Smith kills his cousin, while
Jones “lets” his cousin die. Rachels argues that this distinction is not important since they
both had the same intention and motive. The simple fact that one killed and the other “let
die” is not enough to make any real moral difference.(57)
With further examination of the two cases, however, we can see that there is a
subtle difference. What was the actual cause of the cousin’s death in each case? In the
first, it is clear that Smith is the cause. If he had not been in the bathroom, the cousin
would not have drowned. But, this is not the case in the second. In fact, if Jones had not
been in the bathroom, his cousin would still have drowned. Put concisely, Smith was the
means of his cousin’s death, while Jones was not the means of his cousin’s death.
Although I do agree with Rachels that this distinction is not strong enough to
make Jones’ action morally defensible, when it comes to withdrawing life-support and
PAS the distinction is important. Examining these two cases, there is the same
distinction. On the one hand, when a physician withdraws life-sustaining treatment, he is
not the direct means of the patient’s death; the underlying, terminal disease is. On the
other hand, when a physician prescribes a lethal dose of medication for a patient to
consume, she is the means of the patient’s death. The American College of Physicians’
description of the distinction is nicely worded:
Withdrawal of treatment based on patient’s wishes respects patient’s
bodily integrity and right to be free of unwanted treatment.
PAS/euthanasia are interventions done with the intent to end the patient’s
life.(58)
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But, isn’t the act of removing life-support by the physician the cause of the patient’s
death? If the physician were not there, the patient would still be alive (although still
actively dying unlike the child in the tub) on the life-sustaining measures. The common
understanding is that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and not starting lifesustaining treatment are ethically equivalent. There is no distinction between the two. A
patient can initially refuse life-sustaining treatment whether a physician is present or not.
It is not the presence of the physician that is the cause of the patient’s death; it is the
underlying disease. This same reasoning can then be applied to withdrawing lifesustaining treatment as it is ethically equivalent.
Foreseeing vs. Intending and the Doctrine of Double Effect
The final argument considers the distinction between foreseeing and intending.
What is the difference between giving pain-relieving medication while foreseeing that the
needed medication may hasten death and giving a lethal dose of medication with the
intention of killing the patient to relieve suffering? The doctrine of double effect is
routinely invoked to address this distinction. This doctrine states that the permissibility of
an action with a foreseeable evil side effect depends on the intention of the action. The
formal formulation is as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The action in itself from its object be good or at least indifferent.
The good effect and not the evil effect be intended.
The good effect be not produced by means of an evil effect.
There be a proportionally grave reason for permitting the evil
effect.(59)
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I will examine and address each of these steps in turn following analyses already
discussed by Stephen Latham using classical Catholic moral theories, then use them to
show the distinction between PAS and the use of pain medication to relieve suffering.
First, I will examine step one, “The action in itself from its object be good or at
least indifferent.” Catholic moral theory begins examination of this step with a discussion
of interior and external acts. Interior acts are those that one considers only internally.
There is no acting upon the outside world. Exterior acts are those that are considered
internally and then acted upon the outside world.(60) For example, one might consider
eating an apple. This would be an interior act. If that individual then acted upon the
outside world to grab and eat an apple, it would be an exterior act. These acts can then be
determined good or evil depending on the object to which the act aims.(60) An “object of
an action is that which the agent sets out to do or effect.”(60) Or, simply, an object is the
good at which an agent aims.
When considering interior and external acts, it is important to consider the ends of
these acts. On the one hand, the object and the end are not the same in external acts. For
example, a soccer player’s object may be to score a goal, while the end—via the action of
scoring—would be to win the game and move onto the semifinals. On the other hand, the
object and end are the same in interior acts. Simply thinking about eating an apple has no
other end outside the thought itself.
External acts must then be judged as good or evil based on their objects and not
the ends.(60) Suppose I wish to help a fellow medical student out by giving her a study
guide I made. If my action is to help a fellow medical student (object) by giving her my
study guide (end), then the action may be considered good. If, however, my action is to
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help bolster my image and reputation as a kind, generous, and cooperative medical
student (object) by giving a study guide to her (end), then the action would be evil (or at
least less good). Thus, applying this to the original case between PAS and administration
of pain medication, the object of the former is killing the patient while that of the latter is
administration of morphine. Although they each have the same end to relieve suffering,
only the latter is good “in itself from its object.”(60)
Step two of the formulation addresses what the actor intends. But how does one
determine what someone intends? Catholic moral theory uses a description of the
interrelated relationship between Intellect and Will to discuss this. Every human action
begins with Intellect, which is the ability to understand the facts of the world and make
judgments about them. The Intellect can then decide what it wishes to attain from this
understanding and judgment—an end. Will, is then, the setting in motion of actions that
will lead to the attainment of this end. Thus, “intention” can then be thought of as the
leaning of the Will to attain some end that the Intellect finds desirable. This does not
mean that intention is a means to an end, however. For example, if I wish to learn how to
play guitar (Intellect’s end), my Will can intend to do so, but I still have to find the means
to do this—hire a teacher or learn through a video game, etc.(60)
Latham then addresses the distinction between intentions of proximate and distant
ends. Without this analysis, one might think that the intention in both cases, PAS and
administration of pain medication, is the same, to relieve suffering. It is just the means
that are different in each case. But if one considers proximate and distant intentions, this
is not true. In both cases, there is a distant intention aimed at the end of being good
physicians. In each case, there is a more proximate intention aimed at the end to relieve
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suffering that in turn would lead to the distant end of being a good physician. But, in the
case of PAS, there is an even more proximate intention aimed at the end of killing the
patient to attain the more distant end of the relief of suffering. Thus, one can say that the
proximate end of administrating pain medication is relief of suffering, while the
proximate end of PAS is killing the patient in order to satisfy the more distant end of
relief of suffering.(60)
The third step of the formulation is relatively straightforward and does not need
extensive analysis. The good effect must not be produced by an evil act. It would be
permissible for me to make my colleague famous by writing an article touting her
accomplishments, but it would be impermissible if I made her famous by writing an
article filled with slander.
The last step of the formulation, “There be a proportionally grave reason for
permitting the evil effect,” has to do with the circumstances surrounding the act. In order
for an act to be considered good, it must have a good object, good end, and good
circumstances.(60) For example, if a child with ruptured appendicitis is in a considerable
amount of pain, it would not be justified to give an adequate amount of pain medication
to completely relieve his suffering if there was a chance that that amount would lead to
his death. Although this is a surgical emergency, the child is highly likely to survive
following surgery. If, however, a child is in a considerable amount of pain during a
sickle-cell crisis with fulminant multiple organ failure, then a potentially lethal dose of
pain medication would be justified. In the latter case there is a proportionally grave
reason to give a dose of pain medication that may kill the patient. He is likely to die, thus
controlling his pain at the risk of hastening death is permissible.
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All that is left now is too apply each of the four steps of the doctrine of double
effect to PAS and the administration of pain medication. With regards to PAS: There are
two effects of the act, one good (relief of suffering) and one bad (killing the patient). Is
the act in itself from its object good? No, the object is to kill the patient. Is the good
effect and the not the evil effect intended? No, the proximate end of killing the patient is
intended. Is the good effect not produced by means of the evil effect? No, the relief of
suffering is produced by means of killing. Is there a proportionally grave reason for
permitting the evil effect? As there are doubtless other ways to relieve suffering, this is
likely “no.” In any case, PAS fails to meet the criteria of the doctrine of double effect and
is therefore impermissible.(60)
With respect to administration of pain medication: There are two effects of the
act, one good (relief of suffering) and one bad (risk of killing the patient). Is the act in
itself from its object good? Yes, the object is to give the patient pain medication. Is the
good effect and not the evil effect intended? Yes, the proximate end of relief of suffering
is intended. Is the good effect not produced by means of an evil effect? Yes, relief of
suffering is produced my means of administration of pain medication. Is there a
proportionally grave reason for permitting the evil effect? This depends on the
circumstances. If there are ways to relieve suffering that do not put the patient’s life at
risk, then this is a “no”. If there are no alternative approaches, then this is a “yes”. In the
latter case, administration of pain medication is therefore morally permissible when
considering the criteria set forth by the doctrine of double effect.(60)
I foresee two potential arguments against the doctrine of double effect. First, some
argue that intention does not and should not matter.(61) It is the outcome that matters, not
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the intention (consequentialism). Even if the intention of the physician was not to kill the
patient when giving a potentially lethal dose of medication (the intention was to relieve
suffering), the act is still morally impermissible if the patient dies because the patient
dies. This claim that intention does not matter seems counterintuitive, however. There are
numerous acts that have good and bad effects but are still routinely considered
permissible. Consider surgery; although a surgeon causes controlled trauma to a human
being, it is considered permissible because the intention is to repair an injury or to heal
the patient. If intention did not matter, it would be virtually impossible for an individual
or society to attain desirable ends.
The second argument states that while intention matters, one is still morally
responsible for the ultimate outcome—the death of the patient due to a lethal dose of pain
medication. I agree with this statement, but I do not think its veracity is mutually
exclusive with the doctrine of double effect. Being held morally responsible for an action
does not necessarily have bearing on the determination of the moral permissibility of that
action. A physician who inadvertently causes the death of a patient by administering a
necessary dose of medication to control pain is responsible for the patient’s death. The
act, however, is still morally permissible as indicated by intention and the doctrine of
double effect.
Conclusion
By examining the bioethical arguments of role morality, the “slippery slope,”
doing vs. allowing, and intending vs. foreseeing, I have shown that PAS is morally
impermissible. Included in the physician’s role morality is the concept of “do no harm”,
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which is integral to the safe and ethical practice of medicine. While this doctrine is often
breeched when the good benefits outweigh the harms (i.e. surgery), it should never be
breeched when the harm is directly and intentionally causing the patients death. Although
there is no current data from Oregon to supporting the veracity of the “slippery slope”
argument, PAS legalization is still susceptible to it, which could ultimately lead to the
more prevalent and expanded use of the practice and the legalization of euthanasia. Next,
by examining the ideas of positive vs. negative duties and introducing vs. diverting
threats, it is clear that withdrawing life-support and PAS are morally distinct practices—
the former is “allowing” and the latter is “doing”. Finally, a close examination of the
proximate intentions of PAS and relieving pain with administration of a possibly lethal
dose of medication reveal that they are morally distinct, and the criteria of the doctrine of
double effect is met for administering pain medication but not for PAS.
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Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, I first showed that there are several important aspects of physicians’
beliefs about PAS that should be considered when discussing the appropriateness of
legalizing PAS nationally. I then presented through discussions of several, wellestablished bioethical considerations—role morality, the “slippery slope”, doing vs.
allowing, and foreseeing vs. intending—that the practice of PAS is morally
impermissible. It is clear that this issue is heavily nuanced and is more complex than just
an argument to relieve suffering and respect the autonomy of dying patients.
Perhaps medicine should push for a treatment of death and dying different from
endorsing a practice that intentionally kills patients. Death in the US and most of the
western world has been “medicalized.”(36) Rather than being surrounded by community
and family, death and dying has moved to the domain of medicine, as a large portion of
patients at the end of life die in the hospital. One of the most important reasons for this is
how the medical profession and society more broadly handle death. Death is something to
be shunned, ignored, and saved for a later day. Especially in medicine, the topic of death
is routinely averted in cases where it should necessarily be discussed. Moreover, death is
treated like something that can be conquered or cured rather than an inevitable part of
life. As a result, patients and physicians address death and face difficult end-of-life
decisions for the first time when it is already too late—when patients are already dying in
the hospital. These circumstances obviously lead to inferior end-of-life decision-making
and care.
I am under no illusion that death is an easy topic to talk or think about. It certainly
is not. As mentioned before, we, as humans, have an inherent, existential uneasiness or
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“ambivalence” toward death.(25) But, I think we can, and need, to do better to initiate
conversations about death and dying early and often. In her book, Lydia Dugdale uses
the Ars Moriendi as an example of what this might look like.(62) The Catholic Church in
Europe released this handbook in the decades following Europe’s worst outbreak of the
Bubonic Plague. It was essentially a checklist of items that people could use to prepare
for the death of themselves and their loved ones and offered a framework that spiritually,
emotional, and practically prepared individuals to confront and accept the inevitability of
death.
A system like this would certainly look different in 2019, but if there were a
profession-wide, and society-wide, push to create a system that strove for the similar
preparation for death, it could transform the quality of end-of-life care. Most patients who
ask for physician-assisted suicide do so because of loss of autonomy and being less able
to engage in activities that make life enjoyable.(26) These are existential concerns, not
concerns about physical pain. I have to wonder that if we had a system alike to the Ars
Moriendi in place that prepared individuals for death, existential concerns at the end of
life would be minimized and a practice like physician-assisted suicide would be
superfluous and obsolete.

60
Literature Cited
1.
Opinion 5.7 Physician-assisted suicide. American Medical Association. (Accessed
January 8, 2018, at https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/physician-assistedsuicide.)
2.
State-by-state guide to physician-assisted suicide. (Accessed June 12, 2018, at
https://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132.)
3.
“Death with dignity” laws by state. (Accessed June 12, 2018, at
https://healthcare.findlaw.com/patient-rights/death-with-dignity-laws-bystate.html.)
4.
“Legality of Euthanasia.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia: Wikimedia
Foundation, Inc.
5.
Wood JM, J. Majority of Americans Remain Supportive of Euthanasia. . Gallup
6.
Reese S. Medscape Ethics Report 2016: Life, Death, and Pain. . Medscape.
7.
Death with Dignity Act Requirements. In: Health ODoP, ed. Web:1-2.
8.
Emanuel EJ, Onwuteaka-Philipsen BD, Urwin JW, Cohen J. Attitudes and
Practices of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States, Canada, and
Europe. Jama 2016;316:79-90.
9.
Curlin FA, Nwodim C, Vance JL, Chin MH, Lantos JD. To die, to sleep: US
physicians' religious and other objections to physician-assisted suicide, terminal sedation,
and withdrawal of life support. The American journal of hospice & palliative care
2008;25:112-20.
10.
Cavalieri TA, Pomerantz SC, Ciesielski J, Shinkle JW, Forman LJ. Attitudes of
osteopathic physicians toward physician-assisted suicide. The Journal of the American
Osteopathic Association 2002;102:27-34.
11.
Meier DE, Emmons CA, Wallenstein S, Quill T, Morrison RS, et al. A national
survey of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia in the United States. N Engl J Med
1998;338:1193-201.
12.
Cohen JS, Fihn SD, Boyko EJ, Jonsen AR, Wood RW. Attitudes toward assisted
suicide and euthanasia among physicians in Washington State. N Engl J Med
1994;331:89-94.
13.
Doukas DJ, Waterhouse D, Gorenflo DW, Seid J. Attitudes and behaviors on
physician-assisted death: a study of Michigan oncologists. Journal of clinical oncology :
official journal of the American Society of Clinical Oncology 1995;13:1055-61.
14.
Schmidt TA, Zechnich AD, Tilden VP, Lee MA, Ganzini L, et al. Oregon
emergency physicians' experiences with, attitudes toward, and concerns about physicianassisted suicide. Academic emergency medicine : official journal of the Society for
Academic Emergency Medicine 1996;3:938-45.
15.
Curry L, Gruman C, Blank K, Schwartz HI. Physician-assisted suicide in
Connecticut: physicians' attitudes and experiences. Connecticut medicine 2000;64:40312.
16.
Essinger D. Attitudes of Tennessee physicians toward euthanasia and assisted
death. Southern medical journal 2003;96:427-35.
17.
Kaldjian LC, Jekel JF, Bernene JL, Rosenthal GE, Vaughan-Sarrazin M, et al.
Internists' attitudes towards terminal sedation in end of life care. Journal of medical ethics
2004;30:499-503.

61
18.
Kaldjian LC, Wu BJ, Kirkpatrick JN, Thomas-Geevarghese A, Vaughan-Sarrazin
M. Medical house officers' attitudes toward vigorous analgesia, terminal sedation, and
physician-assisted suicide. The American journal of hospice & palliative care
2004;21:381-7.
19.
Hetzler PT, 3rd, Dugdale LS. Academic Physician Perspectives on the
Legalization and Practice of Physician-Assisted Suicide. Connecticut medicine
2016;80:559-61.
20.
Barnieh L, McLaughlin K, Manns B, Klarenbach S, Yilmaz S, et al. Development
of a survey to identify barriers to living donation in kidney transplant candidates.
Progress in transplantation (Aliso Viejo, Calif) 2009;19:304-11.
21.
Curlin FA, Chin MH, Sellergren SA, Roach CJ, Lantos JD. The association of
physicians' religious characteristics with their attitudes and self-reported behaviors
regarding religion and spirituality in the clinical encounter. Medical care 2006;44:446-53.
22.
Curlin FA, Lawrence RE, Chin MH, Lantos JD. Religion, conscience, and
controversial clinical practices. N Engl J Med 2007;356:593-600.
23.
Groves RMF, F. J.; Couper, M. P.; Lepkowski, J.M.; Singer, E.; Tourangeau, R.
Survey Methodology. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; 2004.
24.
Gaylin W, Kass LR, Pellegrino ED, Siegler M. 'Doctors must not kill'. Jama
1988;259:2139-40.
25.
Burt RA. Death is That Man Taking Names. Berkley, CA: University of
California Press; 2002.
26.
Oregon Death with Dignity Act: Data Summary 2016. In: Public Health Division
CfHS, ed.February 10, 2017.
27.
Chochinov HM, Wilson KG, Enns M, Mowchun N, Lander S, et al. Desire for
death in the terminally ill. The American journal of psychiatry 1995;152:1185-91.
28.
Ganzini L, Goy ER, Dobscha SK. Prevalence of depression and anxiety in
patients requesting physicians' aid in dying: cross sectional survey. BMJ (Clinical
research ed) 2008;337:a1682.
29.
Lamont EB, Christakis NA. Prognostic disclosure to patients with cancer near the
end of life. Ann Intern Med 2001;134:1096-105.
30.
Lambden J, Zhang B, Friedlander R, Prigerson HG. Accuracy of Oncologists'
Life-Expectancy Estimates Recalled by Their Advanced Cancer Patients: Correlates and
Outcomes. Journal of palliative medicine 2016;19:1296-303.
31.
Battin MP, van der Heide A, Ganzini L, van der Wal G, Onwuteaka-Philipsen
BD. Legal physician-assisted dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: evidence concerning
the impact on patients in "vulnerable" groups. Journal of medical ethics 2007;33:591-7.
32.
Byrd WM, Clayton LA. Race, medicine, and health care in the United States: a
historical survey. Journal of the National Medical Association 2001;93:11s-34s.
33.
Fadem P, Minkler M, Perry M, Blum K, Moore JLF, et al. Attitudes of People
with Disabilities toward Physician-Assisted Suicide Legislation: Broadening the
Dialogue. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 2003;28:977-1002.
34.
Trachtenberg AJ, Manns B. Cost analysis of medical assistance in dying in
Canada. CMAJ : Canadian Medical Association journal = journal de l'Association
medicale canadienne 2017;189:E101-e5.
35.
Riley GF, Lubitz JD. Long-term trends in Medicare payments in the last year of
life. Health services research 2010;45:565-76.

62
36.
Hetzler PT, 3rd; Dugdale, L. S. . How Do Medicalization and Rescue Fantasy
Prevent Healthy Dying? AMA Journal of Ethics 2018;20:E766-E73.
37.
Schmidtke A, Hafner H. The Werther effect after television films: new evidence
for an old hypothesis. Psychological medicine 1988;18:665-76.
38.
Jones DA, Paton D. How Does Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide Affect
Rates of Suicide? Southern medical journal 2015;108:599-604.
39.
Walker RM. Physician-assisted suicide: the legal slippery slope. Cancer control :
journal of the Moffitt Cancer Center 2001;8:25-31.
40.
Lerner BH, Caplan AL. Euthanasia in belgium and the netherlands: On a slippery
slope? JAMA Internal Medicine 2015;175:1640-1.
41.
Oregon State Legislature. SB893. 2017.
42.
New Mexico State Legislature. NM HB90. 2019.
43.
Pellegrino ED. Patient and physician autonomy: conflicting rights and obligations
in the physician-patient relationship. The Journal of contemporary health law and policy
1994;10:47-68.
44.
Magelssen M, Supphellen M, Nortvedt P, Materstvedt LJ. Attitudes towards
assisted dying are influenced by question wording and order: a survey experiment. BMC
Medical Ethics 2016;17:24.
45.
Asch DA, Jedrziewski MK, Christakis NA. Response rates to mail surveys
published in medical journals. Journal of clinical epidemiology 1997;50:1129-36.
46.
Luban D. Lawers and Justice: An Ethical Study. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press; 1988.
47.
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California. 17 Cal.3d 425 ed1976.
48.
Volokh EN, D. In Defense of the Slippery Slope. Web: Legal Affairs; 2003.
49.
Peyser A. Terminally ill mom denied treatment coverage—but gets suicide drug
approved. New York Post2016.
50.
Aviv R. The Death Treatment. The New Yorker2015.
51.
Salley M. Marijuana use in Colorado rises for adults, stays the same for kids.
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment; 2019.
52.
Wang GS, Hoyte C, Roosevelt G, Heard K. The Continued Impact of Marijuana
Legalization on Unintentional Pediatric Exposures in Colorado. Clinical Pediatrics
2019;58:114-6.
53.
Brandt AM. Racism and research: The case of the Tuskegee Syphillis study. The
Hastings Center Report 1978;8:21-9.
54.
The Trolley Problem - The Trolley Problem. Know Your Meme2017.
55.
The Trolley Problem - The Fat Man Problem. Know Your Meme2017.
56.
Thomson JJ. Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. Monist: An
International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry 1976;59:204-17.
57.
Rachels J. Active and Passive Euthanasia. The New England Journal of Medicine
1975;292:78-90.
58.
Sulmasy LSM, P. S. Ethics and the Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide:
An American College of Physicians Position Paper. Annals of Internal Medicine
2017;167:576-8.
59.
Mangan J. An Historical Analysis of the Priniciple of Double Effect. Theological
Studies 1949;10:41-6.

63
60.
Latham SR. Aquinas and morphine: notes on double effect at the end of life.
DePaul journal of health care law 1997;1:625-44.
61.
McIntyre A. Doctrine of Double Effect. In: Zalta EN, ed. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition).
62.
Dugdale LS. Dying in the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New Ethical
Framework for the Art of Dying. Boston, MA: MIT Press; 2015.

64

Appendices
Appendix 1
Please indicate for each of the questions how important each item is for you when thinking
about the legalization and practice of physician-assisted suicide.
1)
Patients will perceive the medical profession more positively.
a)
Strongly agree
b)
Agree
c)
Neutral
d)
Disagree
e)
Strongly disagree
2)
Patients will perceive the medical profession more negatively.
a)
Strongly agree
b)
Agree
c)
Neutral
d)
Disagree
e)
Strongly disagree
3)
Patients will trust their doctors less.
a)
Strongly agree
b)
Agree
c)
Neutral
d)
Disagree
e)
Strongly disagree
4)
Patients will trust their doctors more.
a)
Strongly agree
b)
Agree
c)
Neutral
d)
Disagree
e)
Strongly disagree
5)
Legalization of PAS would negatively affect marginalized or underserved
communities, including but not limited to racial and ethic minorities, the disabled, the
elderly, and those of lower socioeconomic status.
a)
Strongly agree
b)
Agree
c)
Neutral
d)
Disagree
e)
Strongly disagree
6)
The legalization of PAS with save health care system money.
a)
Strongly agree
b)
Agree
c)
Neutral
d)
Disagree
e)
Strongly disagree
7)
Medical professionals should never intentionally induce death (“do no harm”
argument).
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a)
Strongly agree
b)
Agree
c)
Neutral
d)
Disagree
e)
Strongly disagree
8)
The legalization of PAS will lead to the legalization of euthanasia (“slippery slope”
argument)
a)
Strongly agree
b)
Agree
c)
Neutral
d)
Disagree
e)
Strongly disagree
9)
The legalization of PAS will improve the clinical care of patients at the end-of-life.
a)
Strongly agree
b)
Agree
c)
Neutral
d)
Disagree
e)
Strongly disagree
10)
The legalization of PAS will worsen the clinical care of patients at the end-of-life.
a)
Strongly agree
b)
Agree
c)
Neutral
d)
Disagree
e)
Strongly disagree
Are there any factors that affect how you think about PAS that are not listed above? If so,
please list them here (free response):
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Appendix 2
Introduction
In this study, we would like to know your views on physician-assisted suicide (PAS), also
known as aid-in-dying (AID), in the United States.
PAS/AID occurs when physicians provide patients with prescriptions for lethal medications
that patients may self-administer with the intention of ending their lives. PAS/AID is
currently legal in six US states, decriminalized in one state, and illegal in forty-three.
This practice is distinct from euthanasia, in which a physician directly administers a drug or
drugs with the intention of ending the patient’s life.

Legality of PAS/AID
1. In your opinion, should PAS/AID be legal in your state?
Yes

No

2. In your opinion, should PAS/AID be decriminalized in your state?
Yes

No

3. If legal or decriminalized, would you participate in the practice of PAS/AID?
Yes

Possibly

Unlikely

Never

Current Practices of PAS/AID
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements for the
practice of PAS/AID in states where it is currently legal:
4. Most patients who seek PAS/AID do so because of physical pain.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree
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5. Current PAS/AID laws provide safeguards (patient must be competent, ≥ 18 yo, prognosis ≤ 6 mo,
capable of self-administration of medication, request observed by 2 witnesses).
These safeguards are adequate to protect patients seeking PAS/AID.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

6. Current PAS/AID laws require physicians who suspect depression or other mental illness in a patient
seeking PAS/AID to consult a psychiatrist.
Physicians who are not psychiatrists are sufficiently trained to screen for depression in patients who are
seeking PAS/AID.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

7. Most physicians can predict with certainty whether a patient seeking PAS/AID has 6 months or less
to live.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Implications of PAS/AID
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements.
If PAS/AID were legalized throughout the United States:
8. PAS/AID would improve the clinical care of patients at the end-of-life.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

9. Patients would view the medical profession more negatively.
Strongly Agree

Agree

10. Patients would trust their physicians more.
Strongly Agree

Agree
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11. Racial and ethnic minorities would feel pressure to end their lives.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

12. Patients with lower socioeconomic status would feel pressure to end their lives.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

13. Patients with mental or physical disabilities would feel pressure to end their lives.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

14. PAS/AID would save money for the health care system.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

15. Health insurance companies would cover PAS/AID over more expensive, possibly life-saving
treatments, like chemotherapy.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

16. PAS/AID would lead to an increased number of medical malpractice suits.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

17. PAS/AID would lead to an increase in suicides in the community.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

18. PAS/AID would lead to the legalization of euthanasia.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

69
Other Considerations Regarding PAS/AID
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:
19. Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to relieve suffering.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

20. Sometimes providing PAS/AID is necessary in order to respect patient autonomy.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

21. There are important ethical distinctions between PAS/AID and withdrawing life-support.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

22. PAS/AID would be unnecessary if all patients had access to excellent palliative care.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

23. The medical profession should endorse PAS/AID as a morally valid medical option.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

24. Physicians who participate in PAS/AID thereby abandon their patients.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

25. A patient’s request for PAS/AID should override the physician’s moral objections to performing it.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree
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Physician Perspectives on Death
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements about death:
26. I am comfortable talking with patients about death.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

27. My ability to think about my own mortality is relevant to providing good care for patients at the end
of life.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

28. Medical professionals should never intentionally hasten a patient’s death at the end of life.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

29. How often are you faced with end-of-life issues in your daily practice?
Several times a week
Every week
Nearly every week
Two to three times a month
About once a month
Several times a year
About once or twice a year
Less than once a year
Never

Strongly Disagree
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30. If you think PAS/AID should be legal or decriminalized but would unwilling or unlikely to perform
it yourself, please explain why.

If you would be willing to participate in a 10-20 minute confidential phone interview about
physician-assisted suicide/aid-in-dying and the practice of medicine, please check this box
and
indicate below the preferred way to reach you. A portion of respondents who volunteer will be
contacted.
Phone number: (_____) ________________
E-mail: ____________________________
Demographics
In the following questions, please tell us more about you and your practice.
31. Do you practice in a Veterans Affairs facility?
Yes

No

32. If not, approximately what percent of the patients that you serve are on Medicaid or underinsured?
0-14%
15-29 %
30-44 %
45-59 %
60-74 %
75-89 %
90-100 %
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33. How old are you?
25-34 yrs
35-44 yrs
45-54 yrs
55-64 yrs
65-75 yrs
75+ yrs
34. What is your preferred gender identity?
____________________________ (leave blank if you do not wish to specify)
35. Do you consider yourself Hispanic or Latino?
Yes
No
36. How would you classify your race? [CHECK ONLY ONE]
Asian
If Asian, do you think of yourself as…
East Asian or Pacific Islander
South Asian
Other Asian
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaskan Native
White or Caucasian
Other (please specify): _________________________
Do not wish to specify
37. What is your medical specialty?
Internal Medicine
Subspecialty: _______________________
Surgery
Subspecialty: _______________________
Psychiatry
Obstetrics/Gynecology
Neurology
Emergency Medicine
Anesthesia
Other
Please specify:_________________

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!

